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Abstract
China’s unilateral pledge to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to
its 2005 levels raises both the stringency issue, and given that China’s pledge is in the
form of carbon intensity, reliability issues concerning China’s statistics on energy and
GDP. Moreover, as long as China’s commitments differ in form from that of other major
greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both criticism on its carbon
intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade measures. In response
to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, this paper will map out a
realistic roadmap for China’s specific climate commitments towards 2050, with its main
distinguishing features including China taking on absolute emission caps around 2030
and the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before that. With
current international climate negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the
targeted date of 2020 that does not accommodate well the world’s two largest greenhouse
gas emitters, the paper suggests a new direction to break the current impasse in
international climate negotiations.
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1. Introduction
Concerned about a range of environmental problems and health risks from burning fossil
fuels and steeply rising oil imports (Ho and Nielsen, 2007; World Bank, 2007; Zhang,
2010a,c), China had incorporated for the first time in its five-year economic plan an input
indicator as a constraint – requiring that energy use per unit of GDP be cut by 20 percent
during the 11th five-year period running from 2006 to 2010. This five-year plan also
incorporated the goal of reducing SO2 emissions and chemical oxygen demand discharge
by 10 percent by 2010, relative to their 2005 levels. This is widely considered an
important step towards building a “harmonious society” through “scientific development”.
Given that China is already the world’s largest carbon emitter (IEA, 2007; MNP, 2007;
EIA, 2009), and its emissions continue to rise rapidly in line with its industrialization and
urbanization, China is seen to have greater capacity, capability and responsibility for
taking on climate commitments. Combined with great pressure both inside and outside
international climate negotiations to be more ambitious in limiting its greenhouse gas
emissions, just prior to the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in December 2009,
China pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to its 2005
levels to help to reach an international climate change agreement at Copenhagen or
beyond.
While this is consistent with China’s longstanding opposition to hard emission
caps on the ground that such limits will restrict its economic growth, this marks a point of
departure from its longstanding position on its own climate actions. The unilateral
commitments clearly indicate China’s determination to further decouple its energy use
and carbon emissions from economic growth. This is a welcome step towards helping to
reach an international climate change agreement.
China’s unilateral commitments raise the issue of whether such a pledge is
ambitious or just represents business as usual. Moreover, as long as China’s
commitments differ in form from that of the U.S. and other major greenhouse gas
emitters, China is constantly confronted with both criticism on its carbon intensity
commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade measures whenever the U.S.
Senate is shaping its climate bill, given that the inclusion of border measures is widely
considered the “price” for passing any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas
emissions. Moreover, the U.S. Senate can always use China as an excuse for its own
failure to pass a long-awaited bill to cap U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper will first examine these issues and concerns. On this basis, the paper
will lay out a realistic roadmap for China to 2050, with its main distinguishing features
including China taking on absolute emission caps around 2030 and the three transitional
periods of increasing climate obligations before that. With current international climate
negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the targeted date of 2020 that does
not accommodate well the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, namely the U.S.
and China, the paper concludes with a suggestion that international climate change
negotiations need to focus on 2030 as the targeted date to cap the greenhouse gas
emissions of the world’s two largest emitters in a legally binding global agreement.
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2. China’s Carbon Intensity Pledge for 2020: Stringency and Implications
2.1 Stringency Issues
Zhang (2000a,b) envision that China could make a voluntary commitment to total
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around 2020.2 However, it is not
until just prior to the Copenhagen Climate Chang Summit that China pledged to cut its
carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels. Wen Jiabao,
China’s Prime Minister, made it clear at Copenhagen that China’s pledges “are
unconditional and they are not dependent on the reduction targets of other nations”
(Watts, 2009).
While some question China’s willing action, real discussion has since focused on
whether such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual (e.g., Qiu, 2009;
Carraro and Tavoni, 2010). While China considers it very ambitious, some Western
scholars (e.g., Levi, 2009) view it just business as usual based largely on the long-term
historical trend of China’s energy intensity.
There are several ways to evaluate how challenging this proposed carbon intensity
target is. One way is to see whether the proposed carbon intensity goal for 2020 is as
challenging as the energy-saving goals set in the 11th five-year economic blueprint. This
involves two issues. One is rational for using energy intensity reduction as a reference.
Given the fixed CO2 emissions coefficients of fossil fuels, which convert consumption of
fossil fuels into CO2 emissions, and given that China’s energy mix is coal-dominated,
cutting China’s carbon intensity is in fact cutting its energy intensity, as clearly indicated
in Figure 1. So we can use measurable and reported data on energy use in the recent years
to infer the stringency of China’s proposed carbon intensity target for 2020. Another
issue requires the establishment of why the 20 percent energy-saving goal for 2010 is
considered very challenging. China had met its aforementioned pollution-cutting goals
ahead of the schedule. However, as discussed in Zhang (2010a,e and 2011), China had
faced great difficulty meeting its energy-saving goal.
In July 2010, China released its energy intensity number for 2009, and its final
energy intensity numbers for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, which are revised
based on the second nationwide economic census. Based on these revised numbers,
China’s energy intensity fell by 15.61 percent from 2006-2009 (NBS et al., 2010). The
country would meet its energy-saving goal if it could cut its energy intensity by 4.39
percent in 2010. However, China’s energy use rose faster than its economic growth in the
first half of 2010, with seven provinces becoming even more energy intensive during this
period. This suggests that the country as a whole needs to accomplish the goal set for the
whole year only within a half year, with some provinces required to fill even big
remaining gaps during this period. Given the annual energy-saving rate of 5.25 percent
2

Zhang (2000b) is the expanded version of China country paper that I initially prepared
for the United Nations Development Programme project on Promoting Development
while Slowing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Growth. When the draft of that China country
paper was released, the Washington DC-based Resources for the Future made a press
release “Is China Taking Actions to Limit Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions?”, 15
September 1998.
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during the period 1980-2000 in which China achieved a quadrupling of its GDP while
cutting its energy intensity by about three quarters (Zhang, 2003), achieving such high
energy-saving rate within a half year poses a significant challenge for the country as well
as for those provinces that lagged behind schedule.
To achieve the goal, it was widely reported that several provinces issued a strict
rotation of rolling blackouts for thousands of factories that required them to shut down
five days for every nine they operate in the second half of 2010 (Sina Net, 2010). Clearly,
the local blackouts were not what the central government intended. While they were not
consistent with the national policy and were not rational, it seemed that local
governments had little choice but to take such irrational measures in such a very short
period of time. Even if it had taken such unprecedented measures, China in the end failed
to meet that energy-saving goal (People Net, 2011).
Moreover, as further discussed below, these reductions in China’s energy
intensity have already factored in the revisions of China’s official GDP data from the
second nationwide economic census, part of the government’s continuing efforts to
improve the quality of its statistics, whose accuracy has been questioned by both the
general public inside of China and many analysts both inside and outside of China. Such
revisions show that China’s economy grew faster and shifted more towards services than
the previously estimated, thus benefiting the energy intensity indicator. Even so, it was
still not easy for China to achieve its own set energy-saving goal. If there were no upward
revisions of GDP data, there would be an even big gap between the target and the actual
performance.
All this clearly indicates that even having picked low-hanging fruit by closing
60.06 gigawatts (GW) of small, inefficient coal-fired power plants in the past four years,
ahead of the national schedule to decommission 50 GW of smaller and older units in the
five years through 2010, helped China to get to where it currently stands (Zhang,
2010a,c). However, those low-hanging fruit opportunities can only be captured once. The
new carbon intensity target set for 2020 requires an additional 20-25 percent on top of the
existing target. Achieving this will clearly be even more challenging and costly for China.
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Figure 1 China’s Energy Intensity Index and Carbon Intensity Index (1980=100),
1980-2007
Sources: Drawn based on China Statistical Yearbook, various years, and Zhang (1997).

Another way is to assess how substantially this carbon intensity target drives
China’s emissions below its projected baseline levels, and whether China does its part as
required in order to fulfill a coordinated global commitment to stabilize the concentration
of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at the desirable level. The World Energy
Outlook (WEO) 2009 (IEA, 2009) has incorporated many policies into the baseline
projection that were not incorporated in the WEO 2007 (IEA, 2007). This projection puts
China’s baseline carbon emissions at 9.6 gigatons of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) in 2020.
Under the ambitious 450 parts per million (ppm) of CO2 equivalent scenario, China’s
CO2 emissions are projected to be 8.4 GtCO2 by 2020, 1.2 GtCO2 less than that in the
baseline (IEA, 2009). Now let us put China’s proposed carbon intensity target into
perspective. The calculations of the paper show that cutting the carbon intensity by 4045% over the period 2006-2020 would bring reductions of 0.46-1.2 GtCO2 in 2020,
which are equivalent to a deviation of 4.8-12.7 percent below the WEO 2009 baseline set
for China in 2020.
Two key points need to be made. First, even the lower end of that range does not
represent business as usual, because it represents a deviation of 4.8 percent below the
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WEO 2009 baseline levels. Second, if China would be able to meet its own proposed 45
percent carbon intensity cut, the country would cut emissions of 1.2 GtCO2 in 2020 from
its baseline levels as is required under the ambitious 450 ppm scenario. That is equivalent
to 31.6 percent of what the world would need to do in 2020 under the 450 ppm scenario,
a share higher than China’s share of the world’s total CO2 emissions (28 percent in 2020).
Clearly, the high end of China’s target, if met, aligns with the specified obligation that
China needs to fulfill under the 450 ppm scenario.
The previous two points clearly show that the proposed carbon intensity target
does not just represent business as usual as some Western scholars have argued.

2.2 Implications of China’s Carbon Intensity Pledge
At Copenhagen, China eventually compromised to agree to open its emissions data to
international consultation and analysis. The EU has identified building a robust and
transparent emissions and performance accounting framework as a key element of
implementing the Copenhagen Accord (European Commission, 2010). How all this will
be worked out remains to be seen. China has not agreed to opening its GDP figures to
international consultation and analysis. But as long as China’s commitments are in the
form of carbon intensity, establishing a robust and transparent emissions and performance
accounting framework is helpful, but not enough to remove international concern about
the reliability of China’s commitments. As discussed in Zhang (2010e and 2011), the
revisions of China’s GDP figures and energy consumption in recent years show that GDP
figures are even more crucial to the impacts on the energy or carbon intensity than are
energy consumption and emissions data. As shown in Table 1, such revisions lead to a
differential between preliminary and final values as large as 123 percent for the energy
intensity in 2006. The aforementioned revisions of China’s GDP figures reflect part of
the government’s continuing efforts to improve the accuracy and reliability of China’s
statistics on economic activity. While they are certainly not being calculated to make the
energy intensity indicator look good to the government’s advantage, such revisions have
huge implications for meeting China’s energy-saving goal in 2010 and its proposed
carbon intensity target in 2020.
Moreover, as long as China’s commitments differ in form from that of the U.S.
and other major greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both
criticism on its carbon intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade
measures whenever the U.S. Senate is shaping its climate bill, given that the inclusion of
border measures is widely considered the “price” for passing any U.S. legislation capping
its greenhouse gas emissions (Zhang, 2009 and 2010b). The U.S. Senate can always use
China as an excuse for its own failure to pass a long-awaited bill to cap U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions. China is also expected to face increasing pressure from the European
Union, who will find it increasingly hard to convince its citizens in general and
companies in particular why the EU has taken the lead but do not see China following,
because overall competitiveness concerns mean that no country is likely to step out too
far in front.
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Table 1 A reduction in China’s energy intensity: preliminary value versus final valuea
Year

Preliminary
value (%)

Revised
value (%)

Re-revised
value (%)

Final value
(%)

Differential
between
preliminary
and final
values (%)

2006

1.23
(March 2007)
3.27
(March 2008)
4.59
(30 June 2009)
3.98c
(March 2010)

1.33
(12 July 2007)
3.66
(14 July 2008)
5.20b
(25 Dec. 2009)
3.61d
(15 July 2010)

1.79
(14 July 2008)
4.04
(30 June 2009)

2.74
(15 July 2010)
5.04
(15 July 2010)
5.20
(15 July 2010)

122.8

2007
2008
2009

54.1
13.3

Notes: a The dates when the corresponding data were released are in parentheses.
b
Based on China’s revised 2008 GDP from the second nationwide economic census,
released in December 2009, which raised the growth rate of GDP to 9.6 percent from the
previously reported 9 percent for that year and the share of services in GDP.
c
Own calculation based on the National Development and Reform Commission’s
reporting that China’s energy intensity was cut by 14.38 percent in the first four years of
the 11th five-year plan relative to its 2005 levels (Xinhua Net, 2010).
d
Based on China’s energy intensity number for 2009, and its final energy intensity
numbers for the years 2005 and 2008 (NBS et al., 2010), my own calculation for this
value would be 3.23 percent, instead of the official reported cut of 3.61 percent.
Sources: Zhang (2010e and 2011).

3. A Roadmap for China to 2050
Indeed, in what format and under what timeframe China would take on climate
commitments is of significant relevance to China because it is facing great pressure both
inside and outside international climate negotiations to exhibit greater ambition and is
being confronted with the threats of trade measures. It is of significant global relevance
as well because when China’s emissions peak is crucial to determine when global
emissions would peak and because what China is going to do in what format has
significant implications for the level and ambition of commitments from other countries.
There is no question that China eventually needs to take on binding greenhouse
gas emissions caps. The key challenges are to decide when that would take place and to
determine the credible interim targets that would be needed during the transition period.
These results will no doubt be a combination of China’s own assessment of its
responsibility, economic and political benefits, and climate change impacts, taking also
into consideration the mounting diplomatic and international pressure and the give and
take of international negotiations.
In the run up to and at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in December
2009, China took the initiative to ally with India and other major developing countries,
7

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 600 [2011]

took full advantage of being the world’s largest carbon emitter, and attempted to secure a
deal to its advantage. It is widely reported that China walked away “happy”. But that did
not come without a high price tag. Whether to admit or not, China angered allies,
abandoned principles that it stuck by during the two weeks of talks, and no doubt stoked
anti-China sentiment in Western nations. The early appearance of this sentiment does not
do China any good because it still has to evolve from a large country to a country that is
truly strong in e.g., science, technology, innovation, economy, etc. Officially China was
backed by allies like India and Brazil, but they admitted in private that this was mainly
China’s battle (Graham-Harrison, 2009).
No doubt, Copenhagen was disappointing to many, particularly given that U.S.
President Obama pledge’s “yes, we can” had raised high expectations for that meeting.
However, the situation could be worse because the negotiations could have completely
collapsed. While falling far short of the legally binding global agreement, the
Copenhagen Accord reflects a political consensus on the main elements of the future
framework among the major emitters and representatives of the main negotiating groups.
For the first time, China was blamed for dragging its feet on international climate
negotiations, previously the accusations always targeted at the U.S.. French President
Nicolas Sarkozy publicly criticized China, saying that China was impeding progress in
climate talks (Watts, 2009). British Energy and Climate Change Secretary Ed Miliband
(2009) wrote in The Guardian that “We did not get an agreement on 50 per cent
reductions in global emissions by 2050 or on 80 per cent reductions by developed
countries. Both were vetoed by China, despite the support of a coalition of developed and
the vast majority of developing countries”. A furious Angela Merkel, German Chancellor,
demanded that “Why can’t we even mention our own targets?”. Kevin Rudd, Australian
Prime Minister, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil’s representative also
pointed out how illogical China’s position was (Lynas, 2009). Being asked in the early
hours of 19 December 2009 why a pledge that applied only to rich nations and to which
all those nations seemed to agree could have vanished from the final document, the
spokesperson for the Swedish government that was serving the EU Presidency at that
time gave the flat reply after the seconds of what-can-I-say silence: “China didn’t like
numbers.” (The Economist, 2010).
It is not so hard to understand why China rejected the aforementioned two
numbers. The needing to cut both global greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent and that
of industrialized countries by 80 percent by 2050 means that emissions in developing
countries are only allowed to increase by 15 percent by 2050 relative to their 1990 levels.
Given their very low levels in 1990, China considers this unacceptable. There could be a
misinterpretation here. Some may interpret that a 15 percent increase by 2050 would
mean that the developing country’s emissions are allowed to only increase by 15 percent
in any specific year from now on to 2050. This is not correct. Emissions in developing
countries can be much higher than the level allowed by a 15 percent increase prior to
2050 and then come down to that proposed allowable level by 2050. Indeed, under the
450 parts per million of CO2 equivalent scenario, CO2 emissions in China are projected to
go from 2.2 GtCO2 in 1990 and 6.1 GtCO2 in 2007 to 8.4 GtCO2 in 2020, while the
corresponding figures for India are estimated to go from 0.6 GtCO2 in 1990 and 1.3
GtCO2 in 2007 to 1.9 GtCO2 in 2020 (IEA, 2009). Relative to their levels in 1990 and
2007, CO2 emissions in 2020 increase by 282 percent and 37 percent for China and by
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117 percent and 46 percent for India, respectively. More importantly, rejecting a longstanding, widely reported proposal without putting forward alternatives cast China in a
very bad light. It led to the impression that rich countries should not even announce their
unilateral cut, which was at least reported by the Western media.3
In response to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, I propose
that at current international climate negotiations China should negotiate a requirement
that greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries be cut at least by 80 percent by
2050 relative to their 1990 levels and that per capita emissions for all major countries by
2050 should be no more than the world’s average at that time. Moreover, it would be in
China’s own best interest if, at the right time (e.g., at a time when the U.S. Senate is
going to debate and ratify any global deal that would emerge from current international
climate negotiations), China signals well ahead that it will take on binding absolute
emission caps around the year 2030.4 While this date is later than the time frame that the
U.S. and other industrialized countries would like to see, it would probably still be too
soon from China’s perspective.
However, it is hard to imagine how China could apply the brakes so sharply as to
switch from rapid emissions growth to immediate emissions cuts, without passing
through several intermediate phases. After all, China is still a developing country, no
matter how rapidly it is expected to grow in the future. Taking the commitment period of
five years that the Kyoto Protocol has adopted, I envision that China needs the following
three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations, before taking on absolute
emissions caps.
Further credible energy conservation commitments starting 2013
China has already committed itself to quantified targets on energy conservation and the
use of clean energy. It needs to extend its level of ambition, further making credible
quantified domestic commitments in these areas for the second commitment period and
aiming for a 46-50 percent cut in its carbon intensity by 2020 (Zhang, 2010c,e).
Voluntary “no lose” emission targets starting 2018
During this transition period, China could commit to adopting voluntary emission
reduction targets. Emissions reductions achieved beyond these “no lose” targets would
then be eligible for sale through carbon trading at the same world market price as those of
developed countries whose emissions are capped, relative to the lower prices that China
currently receives for carbon credits generated from clean development mechanism
projects, meaning that China would suffer no net economic loss by adhering to the targets.
Binding carbon intensity targets starting 2023, leading to emissions caps around 2030

3

Some of China’s stance and reactions at Copenhagen are generally well rooted because
of realities at home. Some reactions could have been handled more effectively for a better
image of China, provided that there were good preparations and deliberations. See Zhang
(2010d) for further discussion on China’s stance and reactions at Copenhagen.
4
See Zhang (2010b,f and 2011) for detailed discussion on why around 2030 is
considered the timing for China to take on absolute greenhouse gas emissions caps.
9
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While it is expected to incorporate the carbon intensity target as a domestic commitment
for the first time in its 12th five-year plan period starting 2011, China adopting binding
carbon intensity targets in 2023 as its international commitment would be a significant
step towards committing to absolute emissions caps during the subsequent commitment
period. At that juncture, having been granted three transition periods, China could then be
expected to take on binding emissions caps, starting around 2030 and to aim for the
global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050.
Overall, this proposal is a balanced reflection of respecting China’s rights to grow
and recognizing China’s growing responsibility for increasing greenhouse gas emissions
as the standards of living increase over time. The commitments envisioned for China are
basic principles. They leave ample flexibility for China to work out the details, as
international climate change negotiations move onward. The value of this proposal lies in
the format and timeframe under which China would be included in a post-2012 climate
change regime, not in the numerical details. It should not be taken for granted that China
can take on such increasingly stringent commitments, because that would entail
significant efforts to cut China’s projected emissions below its baselines. Political reality
may limit the ability of the U.S. to take on significant emissions cuts by 2020 that
developing countries called for, but as a tradeoff, the U.S. should significantly scale up its
technology transfer and deployment, financing and capacity building to enable China to
do that. This is at the least what the U.S. could and should do, and by example can
encourage other developed counties to do the same. As Winston Churchill said, “[you]
can always count on the Americans to do the right thing – after exhausting every other
alternative.” After what is viewed as eight years of lost time under U.S. President Bush,
the whole world bets that U.S. will not disappoint us this time. Only history will tell us
whether that will be the case.
In the meantime, commitments by China would send a signal well in advance that
China is seriously committed to addressing climate change issues. They will also
alleviate, if not completely remove, U.S. and other industrialized country’s concerns
about when China will join them, an indication that the world has long awaited from
China, and help U.S. to take on long-expected emissions commitments, thus paving the
way for reaching a post-2012 international climate change agreement.

4. A New Direction of Future International Climate Negotiations
However, current international climate negotiations have been focused on commitments
on the targeted date of 2020. With the commitment period only up to 2020, there is very
little room left for the U.S. and China, although for reasons very different from each other.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calls for cutting global
greenhouse gas emissions at least in half by 2050. To achieve that goal, the IPCC fourth
assessment report recommends that global greenhouse gas emissions should peak by
2020 at the latest and then turn downward in order to avoid dangerous climate change
consequences, calling for developed countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by
25-40 percent by 2020 relative to their 1990 levels (IPCC, 2007). This recommendation
was incorporated into the Bali Roadmap at the United Nations Climate Summit in 2007.
This seems a logical choice. Once the long-term goal (namely the target for 2050) is set,

10
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one needs a mid-term goal to help facilitate the long-term one. From then, the
negotiations on industrialized countries’ commitments have been on what emissions
reduction targets would be in 2020.
However, 2020 is just around the corner. More importantly, this date does not
accommodate well the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, namely the U.S. and
China. Because the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, it has not made any
substantial preparations to cut emissions as other Kyoto-constrained industrialized
countries have done over the past decade. Whether you like it or not, this is a political
reality. It is very hard for an unprepared country like the U.S. to take on a substantial
emissions cut in 2020 as developing countries have demanded, although it should on a
moral ground.
In the meantime, China overtook the U.S. to become the world’s largest
greenhouse gas emitter in 2007, at least twenty years earlier than what was estimated by
the U.S. EIA (2004) as late as 2004. The IEA (2009) estimates that about half of the
growth of global energy-related CO2 emissions until 2030 will come from China.
Combined with huge trade deficit with China, the U.S. has pushed for China to take on
emissions caps as early as 2020. Otherwise, the goods exported from China to U.S.
markets might be subject to carbon tariffs (Zhang, 2010b and 2011). However, as argued
in Zhang (2010b,f and 2011), the year 2020 is not a realistic date for China to take on the
absolute emissions cap, because its carbon emissions would be still on the climbing
trajectories beyond 2030, even if some energy saving policies and measures have been
factored into such projections. Meanwhile, taking on commitments for 2050 seems too
far away for politicians.
If the commitment period is extended to 2030, it would really open the possibility
for the U.S. and China to make the commitments that each wants from the other in the
same form, although the scale of reductions would differ from each other. By 2030, the
U.S. will be able to commit to much deeper emission cuts that China and developing
countries have demanded, while, as argued in Zhang (2010b,f and 2011), China would
have approached the threshold to take on the absolute emission cap that the U.S. and
other industrialized countries have long asked for.
Being aware of his proposed provisional target in 2020 well below what is
internationally expected from the U.S., President Obama announced a provisional target
of a 42 percent reduction below 2005 levels in 2030 to demonstrate the U.S. continuing
commitments and leadership to find a global solution to the threat of climate change.
While the U.S. proposed level of emission reductions for 2030 is still not ambitious
enough, President Obama inadvertently points to the right direction of international
climate negotiations. Namely, international climate negotiations need to look at the
targeted date of 2030. If international negotiations could lead to much deeper emission
cuts for developed countries as well as the absolute emission caps for major developing
countries in 2030, that would significantly reduce the legitimacy of the U.S. proposed
carbon tariffs and, if implemented, their prospect for withstanding a challenge before
World Trade Organization. That will also alleviate concern about when China’s
greenhouse gas emissions will peak and what China is going to do in what format. More
importantly, it really opens the possibility to cap the greenhouse gas emissions of the
world’s two largest emitters in a legally binding global agreement.

11

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

11

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 600 [2011]

References
Carraro, C and Tavoni M (2010) Looking ahead from Copenhagen: how challenging is
the Chinese carbon intensity target?. VOX,
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4449.
EIA (2004), International Energy Outlook 2004, U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA), Washington, DC.
EIA (2009), International Energy Outlook 2009, DOE/EIA-0484(2009), U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA), Washington, DC, 27 May.
European Commission (2010) International climate policy post-Copenhagen: acting now
to reinvigorate global action on climate change. COM(2010) 86 final, Brussels, 9
March, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/com_2010_86.pdf.
Graham-Harrison, E (2009) Snap analysis: China happy with climate deal, image dented.
Reuters, 18 December,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BI0DH20091219.
Ho, M. and C. Nielsen (2007), Clearing the Air: The Health and Economic Damages of
Air Pollution in China, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
IEA (2007), World Energy Outlook 2007, International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris.
IEA (2009), World Energy Outlook 2009, International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007), Climate Change 2007:
Mitigation of Climate Change, Working Group III Contribution to the Fourth
Assessment Report, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Levi, M (2009) Assessing China’s carbon cutting proposal. Council on Foreign Relations,
New York, 30 November.
Lynas, M. (2009), ‘How do I know China wrecked the Copenhagen deal? I was in the
room’, The Guardian, 23 December,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climatechange-mark-lynas.
Miliband, E. (2009), The road from Copenhagen, The Guardian, 20 December,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/20/copenhagen-climatechange-accord.
National Bureau of Statistic (NBS), National Development and Reform Commission and
National Energy Administration (2010) Bulletin on energy use per unit of GDP
and other indicators by region. Beijing, 3 August,
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/qttjgb/qgqttjgb/t20100803_402662765.htm.
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP, 2007), China Now No. 1 in CO2
Emissions; USA in Second Position, 19 June.
People Net (2011), Energy consumption per unit of GDP expected to fall by 19.06%
during the 11th five-year period, 11 February,
http://env.people.com.cn/GB/13892587.html.
Qiu, J (2009) China’s climate target: is it achievable?. Nature 462: 550-551.
Sina Net (2010) Special topic on a last-minute rush for meeting pollution-cutting goals:
restrictions on production and electricity use across the country.
http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/jpxcxd/index.shtml.

12

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper600

12

Zhang: Breaking the Impasse in International Climate Negotiations:A

The Economist (2010), ‘Climate change after Copenhagen: China’s thing about numbers’,
2 January, pp. 43-44.
Watts, J (2009) China ‘will honour commitments’ regardless of Copenhagen outcome.
The Guardian, 18 December,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/china-wen-jiabaocopenhagen.
World Bank (2007), Cost of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of Physical
Damages, Washington DC,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resource
s/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf.
Xinhua Net (2010) NDRC: the 11th five-year pollution-cutting goals met ahead of the
schedule. 10 March, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-03-10/152019834186.shtml.
Zhang, Z.X. (1997), The Economics of Energy Policy in China: Implications for Global
Climate Change, New Horizons in Environmental Economics Series, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, USA.
Zhang, Z.X. (2000a), Decoupling China’s Carbon Emissions Increases from Economic
Growth: An Economic Analysis and Policy Implications, World Development,
Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 739-752.
Zhang, Z.X. (2000b), Can China Afford to Commit itself an Emissions Cap? An Economic
and Political Analysis, Energy Economics, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 587-614.
Zhang, Z.X. (2003), Why Did the Energy Intensity Fall in China’s Industrial Sector in the
1990s?, The Relative Importance of Structural Change and Intensity Change,
Energy Economics, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 625-638.
Zhang, Z.X. (2009), Multilateral Trade Measures in a Post-2012 Climate Change
Regime?: What Can Be Taken from the Montreal Protocol and the WTO?, Energy
Policy, Vol. 37, pp. 5105-5112.
Zhang, Z.X. (2010a), Is It Fair to Treat China a Christmas Tree to Hang Everybody’s
Complaints? Putting its Own Energy-Saving into Perspective, Energy Economics,
Vol. 32, pp. S47-S56.
Zhang, Z.X. (2010b), The U.S. Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO Scrutiny and China’s
Responses, International Economics and Economic Policy, Vol. 7, Nos. 2-3, pp.
203-225.
Zhang, Z.X. (2010c), China in the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy, Energy Policy,
Vol. 38, pp. 6638-6653.
Zhang, Z.X. (2010d), ‘Copenhagen and beyond: reflections on China’s stance and
responses’, in E. Cerdá and X. Labandeira (eds), Climate Change Policies:
Global Challenges and Future Prospects, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton,
MA: Edward Elgar, 239-253.
Zhang, Z.X. (2010e), Assessing China’s Carbon Intensity Pledge for 2020: Stringency
and Credibility Issues and their Implications, Nota di Lavoro 158.2010,
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, Italy; Environmental Economics and Policy
Studies, doi:10.1007/s10018-011-0012-4.
Zhang, Z.X. (2010f), In What Format and under What Timeframe Would China Take on
Climate Commitments? A Roadmap to 2050, Nota di Lavoro 112.2010,
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, Italy; International Environmental
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, forthcoming.

13

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 600 [2011]

Zhang, Z.X. (2011), Energy and Environmental Policy in China: Towards a Low-Carbon
Economy, New Horizons in Environmental Economics Series, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, USA.

14

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper600

14

